Competition is emerging in OECD Member State mobile telephony markets, albeit somewhat unevenly and at a slower rate. The study addresses the relationship between market structure and performance, and examines the impact of regulatory policy on competition in these markets. A structural model is estimated on a panel of 27 OECD Member States mobile markets for the period 1998-2004. This simultaneous equations model contains equations for market concentration, price, cellular density and profit.
I. Introduction
With rapid diffusion of mobile telephones, mobile telephone markets (hereafter mobile markets) have been transformed into one of the most competitive parts of the telecommunications sector. Competition in mobile markets led to lower price, which in turn generated further diffusion of mobile telephones and also, to greater variety and higher quality of mobile services. This emerging competitive mobile market structure has been frequently compared with near-monopolistic local telephone markets in which a former incumbent monopoly still holds a strong market dominant position. Some telecommunications sector-specific regulators argue that their mobile markets are effectively competitive and hence, suggest a general reliance on ex post competition law in place of ex ante sector-specific regulation. 1 On the other hand, even in developed countries, there are substantial differences in terms of competitiveness. For example, as of 2004, the Herfindahl-Hirschman index 1 FCC (2005, p. 4) indicates that "although the mobile telephone market has become more concentrated as a result of the merger of two nationwide carriers, none of the remaining competitors has a dominant share of the market, and the market continues to behave and perform in a competitive manner." Thus FCC concludes that there is still effective competition in the U.S. mobile services market place. OFCOM(2006, p. 20) concludes that "competition has been sustainable between a sufficient number of networks, each providing end-to-end services to customers, to constitute effective competition." (HHI) value for the United Kingdom (UK) mobile markets is 2,309, which is approximately half of that for Norway (5,620) or New Zealand (5,063). While both the UK and Denmark were served by four operators in 2004, UK operators had almost identical market shares, whereas TDC Mobile, the Danish incumbent carrier, had approximately 50% domestic market share. Concurrently with differences in mobile market structure, significant variations in the performance of mobile market are observable across countries. For illustration, medium users in Poland paid three times as much as those in Finland for mobile telephone charges in 2004. 2 In sum, mobile market competition is not successfully evolving in all developed countries. Moreover, mobile markets are becoming more competitively albeit at a slower rate, and face the threat of re-concentration caused by a merger of nationwide carriers.
The objective of the study is twofold. First, the study examines the effect of national regulatory settings on competition within mobile markets mainly to explain variations in mobile market structure and performance across OECD Member States. With entry into mobile markets being restricted by the available spectrum and technology, the number of mobile operators and their entry point of time have been controlled by sector-specific regulatory policy. Thus, it is obvious that national regulatory settings had to some extent 2 OECD(2005) provides basket of mobile telephone charges for low, medium, and high user in OECD Member states.
an influence on mobile market structure and performance. Second, the study addresses the structure-conduct-performance (SCP) relationship in mobile markets. In particular, the study analyzes whether the positive correlation between market concentration and profitability observed in OECD mobile markets may be explained by the market-power (or SCP) hypothesis or by the efficient-structure (or efficiency) hypothesis. The marketpower hypothesis argues that the positive concentration-profit relationship reflects the setting of price less favorable to consumers in more concentrated markets as a result of non-competitive behavior. The efficiency hypothesis states that differences in firmspecific efficiency create unequal market shares and high levels of concentration. Tests of these alternative hypotheses can provide useful policy implications.
To accomplish these objectives, a structural model of mobile markets is estimated using annual panel data of 27 OECD Member States for the period 1998-2004. 3 In particular, the simultaneous equations model is composed of four equations; market concentration, mobile price, mobile penetration ratio and profit. The system estimation is carried out by combining two-stage least squares (2SLS) or instrumental variable (IV) estimation method with panel analysis models. Empirical results support the market-power hypothesis and indicate that various regulatory policies affect mobile market structure and performance.
While empirical studies on mobile markets focus mostly on global and national mobile telephone diffusion, few studies investigate into the SCP relationship for mobile markets. 4 The SCP paradigm has been tested in numerous empirical studies on manufacturing, banking, transportation etc. 5 This study is related to Sung (2006) in that both studies consider the SCP relationship for OECD mobile markets. The study is based on annual country data, while Sung (2006) uses annual operator data.
The paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the evolution of competition in OECD Member States mobile markets. In Section III, the empirical model is specified with a short description on the alternative hypotheses. Section IV explains sample data used in the study and then, reports estimation results. Section V concludes with a brief discussion of policy implications.
II. Market Structure and Performance in OECD Mobile Markets
Competition in OECD mobile markets However, there appears no ready ex post rationalization for the existence of those groups based on domestic population size, population density or economic development. For example, the third group (4,000 ≤ HHI < 5,000) has the highest gross domestic product per capita, while the fourth group (5000 ≤ HHI ) has the lowest one.
The majority of European Member States, including France and Germany, are located in the second group (3,000 ≤ HHI < 4,000 band). National markets in this group are usually composed of three or four operators. The remaining third and fourth groups (4,000 ≤ HHI < 5,000 band and HHI ≥ 5,000 band, respectively) have substantially more concentrated markets. The number of operators competing in these markets is typically equal to or fewer than three. In particular, New Zealand and Norway are served by duopoly operators. MNP is put in force in 80% (75%) of countries belonging to the second (third) group, while it is rarely enforced in the fourth group. However, except for operator numbers and MNP, no substantial difference in the market and regulatory characteristics among these three groups are observable. For example, the second group has higher average for ARPM than other two groups. Therefore, a formal econometric analysis is required to investigate into the reasons for difference in competitiveness across countries.
Mobile Market Structure and Performance
Figure 1 graphs the relationship of market concentration (HHI) to performance variables by using all observations. Market concentration exhibits a weak positive correlation with ARPM and the EBITDA margin. 8 That is, it appears that more concentrated mobile market structure is associated with higher price and higher profit in OECD mobile markets. Conversely, HHI has a negative relationship with cellular subscribers per 100 persons, 9 implying that competitive market structure accelerates mobile diffusion. Finally, the correlation coefficient between HHI and churn rate is negatively signed but is not statistically different from zero. 10 That is, customers in more competitive mobile markets tend to switch their operator more frequently, but this finding should be carefully considered.
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III. Empirical Model

Alternative Hypotheses on the SCP Relationship
Numerous empirical studies, mainly relying on inter-industry cross-sectional data, have sought to estimate the relationship between market structure and performance as 8 The correlation coefficient between HHI and ARPM (EBITDA margin) is 0.123 (0.227). 9 The correlation coefficient between HHI and cellular density is -0.284. 10 Churn refers to the number of customers an operator loses over a given period of time.
OECD (2003) regards churn rate as one of important indicators for the assessment of telecommunications competition. However, churn is not considered in econometric estimation in the study due to a paucity of data. The reason is that the existence of geographically limited markets in banking offers researchers the advantage of comparing profitability and concentration across markets (Berger and Hannan, 1989, p. 291) . Refer to Goldberg and Rai (1996) for a brief survey of the banking literature on the SCP relations.
concentrated markets by their ability to offer higher price. The efficient-structure hypothesis states that efficient firms increase in size and market due to their ability to generate higher profit, which usually leads to more concentrated market structure.
While many empirical studies in the banking literature have tested the two hypotheses, they have yielded mixed results.
The study attempts to test the alternative explanations by examining the structureprice relationship as well as the structure-profit relationship. 12 While the two hypotheses yield an equivalent prediction for the concentration-profit relationship, they imply opposite predictions for the concentration-price relationship. The efficientstructure hypothesis suggests that efficient firms are able to reduce costs (and hence price) concurrently with increase in their market share. Under the SCP paradigm, more concentrated market structure implies individually or collectively stronger market power, which leads to higher price. Therefore, the concentration-price prediction of the SCP paradigm, along with the concentration-profit prediction, allows it to be 12 Robust tests of the alternative hypotheses can be conducted by incorporating measures of efficiency directly in the model as Berger (1995) proposed in the banking literature. Berger (1995) applies a cost frontier model to derive measures of efficiency and then, incorporates the efficiency measure into the structure-performance relationship. This method, however, cannot be applied in the study partly because input data are not publicly available in mobile markets and partly because the study does not use company data but country data.
distinguished empirically from the efficient-structure view (Hannan, 1991, p. 82) . 13 A positive (negative) structure-price relationship, along with a positive structure-profit relationship, supports the market-power (efficient-structure) hypothesis.
Figure 2 describes the SCP relations used in the study. First of all, mobile market structure has an effect on mobile price, the direction of which depends on the alternative hypotheses. Second, price and non-price competition are assumed to promote mobile telephone diffusion. It is widely accepted that lower price and mobile handset subsidy have accelerated mobile telephone diffusion in many countries. Non-price competition such as mobile handset subsidy is likely to be more severe in less concentrated market, implying that market structure may have a direct effect on mobile telephone diffusion.
Third, market concentration can affect profit through non-price factors such as brand loyalty. The study measures profit by the EBITDA margin, which includes accumulated depreciation as well as operating income. Thus national cellular density are considered to control for cross-country depreciation variation. Finally, profit may conversely affect market structure. 14 For example, an incumbent monopoly with deep pocket may make a strong effort to attract new subscribers by spending in various marketing activities, which leads to increase in its market share and hence, to more concentrated market.
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Structural Form of Simultaneous Equations Model
Since market concentration, price, cellular density, and profit are all endogenously determined, a simultaneous equations model should be specified. 15 In particular, a structural model is comprised of equations for market concentration (HHI), price (ARPM), cellular density (CELDEN), and profit (EBITDA) as follows: Geroski (1982) . unobservable time-invariant and unit-variant country-specific effects, while it e is an unobservable time-variant and unit-variant random disturbance. Since the empirical analysis is based on panel data, unobservable individual effects can be controlled for.
The country-specific individual effects term can control for any inherent difference in efficiency between countries as well.
As indicated in Figure 2 , regulatory, institutional and market environmental variables may affect market structure, price, cellular density and profit. Table 4 provides definitions for variables used in the study, while 
Estimation Method
The system of equations contains four endogenous variables and fifteen 
IV. Empirical Results
Data and Variables
The primary sources of data used in the analysis are the Merill Lynch Global
Wireless Matrix (GWM), ITU World Telecommunications Indicators (WTI) and World
Bank World Development Indicators (WDI). Mobile market data are collected from the GWM, while country profile data are compiled from the WTI and WDI. Data on country-specific regulatory policy are sourced from various consultant reports and regulator documentation. The time span encompassed by the study is 1998-2004, which corresponds with the rapid growth and maturation of mobile markets. Table 6 through 9 reports estimation results from applying alternative econometric specifications and estimation methods to the four equations. Models 1 and 2 are estimated by applying conventional panel analysis models with all endogenous variables being treated as pre-determined. Models 3 and 4 use 2SLS or IV estimation method to address the endogeneity problem. Models 1 and 3 are fixed-effect (FE) models, while Models 2 and 4 are random-effects (RE) models. In Table 6 , the estimated parameters for EBITDA in Models 3 and 4 are not significantly different from zero, implying that profit does not affect market structure. It is likely that substantial marketing efforts initiated by an incumbent lead to more concentrated markets but reduce profit of all players at the same time. Thus Models 1 and 2 are estimated with the variable EBITDA being deleted.
Empirical Results for Market Concentration Equation
One of principal findings in the market structure equation is that regulatory policy affects market concentration. As expected, the estimated parameters for COMP have always a negative sign and are mostly statistically significant. That is, as a country has a longer competition period, it tends to have less concentrated market structure. The 
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Empirical Results for Price Equation
In the price equation (Table 7) , the reported parameter estimates for HHI are always positively signed and statistically significant. That is, mobile price tends to be higher in more concentrated market structure, strongly supporting the market-power hypothesis.
As explained before, the negative structure-price relationship should be confirmed
18 When the reduced form of the market concentration equation is estimated by using ordinary least squares methods, the above results are more strengthened. The regression coefficients of COMP, INCUMB, NOOP and GLOB have a theoretically expected sign and are statistically significant. On the other hand, the parameter estimate of MNP is negatively signed but statistically insignificant. It is not inconsistent with the common sense because the introduction of MNP promotes price competition but does not favor any specific operator.
under the efficient-structure hypothesis. Therefore, mobile markets may be not primarily governed by competitive forces but regulatory policy. This is compatible with the previous finding that regulatory policy affects mobile market structure with unobservable country-specific factors being controlled for. The country-specific factors may include inherent differences in the efficiency between countries.
The parameter estimates for SUB and SUB2 are always statistically significant and their sign is negative and positive, respectively, indicating that a country's subscriber base tends to reduce service provision costs (and hence mobile price) at slower rate.
Thus, economies of scale are important but the impact attenuates as the size of network increases. On the other hand, the parameter estimates for other variables measuring mobile provision costs (POPDEN and RPOL) are unclear concerning their effects on price. Results show that population density has no impact on price, while RPOPL (ratio of rural population) raises price. The variable RPOPL, however, has statistically insignificant parameter estimates in the random-effects model. The coefficients for MNP have a negative sign except for Model 3 and are statistically significant only in the random-effects models. MNP may lead to price decline via reduction in switching cost reduction but its effect is not unambiguous.
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Empirical Results for Cellular Density Equation
In the cellular density equation (Table 8) , the estimated HHI parameters are negatively signed and statistically significant in all models. That is, mobile market competition tends to accelerate mobile diffusion. The parameter estimates for ARPM are negatively signed and mostly statistically significant, indicating that lower mobile price raises mobile subscriptions. The estimated parameters for GDPPC have a positive sign in Models 1 and 2, implying that a country with higher national income has a higher mobile penetration rate. However, when unobservable country-specific effects are controlled for its effect is not statistically confirmed. The coefficients of TELDEN have a negative sign and are statistically significant in the random-effects models, confirming the negative relationship between mobile and fixed telephones.
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Empirical Results for Profit Equation
parameter estimates varies by specification. In the random-effects models, the estimated parameters for CELDEN and HHI are positively signed and statistically significant, which indicates that mobile operators tends to have higher operating income and depreciation in countries with more mobile subscriptions and more concentrated mobile structure. In the fixed-effects models, however, the effects become statistically unclear.
The opposite is true for AGE. The parameter estimates for AGE is statistically significant in the fixed-effects model but insignificant in the random-effects model. This may happen because both CELDEN and AGE capture depreciation variation across countries and years. The coefficients for GLOB and DIGM are statistically insignificant in all models, implying that both inflow of foreign capital from the three global carriers and cellular mobile digitalization ratio have no impact on EBITDA margin.
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V. Conclusions
The study estimates a structural model on annual national mobile market data for the period 1998-2004. In the study, the interaction between market concentration, price, mobile diffusion and profit for OECD Member State mobile markets confirmed.
Estimation results indicate that more concentrated mobile markets lead to higher mobile telephone price and higher profit, supporting the market-power hypothesis. In turn,
higher mobile price and more concentrated market structure are found to suppress mobile diffusion. Also, the study provides evidence that regulatory policy affects mobile market structure and performance.
The market-power hypothesis suggests that antitrust or regulatory action may be productive in mobile markets. Mobile markets share several features in common with banking but are fundamentally different from banking in some aspects. First of all, with entry into national markets being restricted by the available spectrum and technology, mobile markets cannot afford as many competitors as banking. In mobile markets, either delayed entry or a merger of competitors may substantially lessen competition.
19 Sung (2006) shows that delay in market entry lowered operator market share and profit.
Therefore, it may be difficult to restore the once destroyed mobile market competition.
Recently mobile telephone services are rapidly taking the place of fixed telephone services as the necessities of life and a universal telephone service. Therefore, it should be one of important telecommunications policy objectives to protect or promote mobile market competition. In particular, regulators should scrutinize a merger of facility-based mobile operators because any substantial reduction of the effective competitor base will likely lead to the diminution of consumer welfare. Note: * Some of the observations are forecasted by using price data from various sources. Note. *, **, *** means statistical significance at 1%, 5%, and 10% level, respectively. FE and RE refer to fixed-effects and random-effects model, respectively, while IV implies instrumental variable regression model. P-value is in parenthesis. 
